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Life, the distinguishing feature of organisms, is best thought of as involving some kind of complex 
organization, giving an ability to use energy sources for self-maintenance and reproduction. 






Despite major advances in the last two centuries—life expectancy at birth grew, in Europe, from 
about 36 years in 1820 to more than 80 years today—human lives remain inherently fragile and 
uncertain. Individuals do not, in general, know how long they will live, or, to put it differently, 
most humans are ignorant of the age at which they will die. This uncertainty about the duration 
of life constitutes a major aspect of human lives. To illustrate this, figure 1 shows the 




Economists have, since the early stages of the discipline, paid particular attention to the 
material and social conditions making self-maintenance and reproduction—and thus life—
possible for humans. In those early economic analyses of longevity, premature mortality was 
viewed as a mechanism adjusting the population size to the available resources. 
Botero ([1588] 1985) regarded premature mortality (through conflicts, famines, or 
diseases) as a mechanism reducing the population size to a level compatible with the available 
means of subsistence. In a similar vein, Smith ([1776] 1922) argued that premature mortality 
adjusts the supply of men to the demand for men. Under excess labor, the market wage falls 
below its “natural” level—equal to the subsistence wage—leading to premature deaths within the 
population until the excess labor supply has disappeared. That adjustment is close to what 
Malthus ([1798] 1970) called the “positive population check.” According to his Principle of 
Population, there exists an imbalance between the capacity of a society to produce men and its 






Figure 1. Period survival curves, United States, females and males, 2010. Source: The Human 
Fertility Data Base. 
 
Premature mortality is also the starting point of the socialist criticism of market 
economies and of classical political economy. Marx (1844) criticized Smith’s Wealth of Nations 
on the grounds that it promotes a market system where the production of men adjusts itself to the 
demand for labor, as if humans were a commodity like any other commodity. In later writings, 
Marx ([1867] 1970) argued that there exists no universal Principle of Population: premature 
deaths are due to large wealth inequalities under the capitalist regime of production. 
As the father of modern “economics,” Jevons (1871, 254) argued that the new economics 
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economics”). The direct problem of economics should be, according to Jevons, the allocation of 
scarce resources (land, labor) among different uses for a given population. 
Although Jevons’s argument has not been decisive, it is nonetheless true that the new 
emphasis of economics on decisions regarding the allocation of resources has changed the way in 
which economists look at human lives. Instead of studying the material and social conditions 
affecting longevity, economists now examine how individuals tend, by their allocation decisions 
(in terms of resources and activities), to affect their life, in terms of quality and quantity. This 
economic analysis of human lives is known as life-cycle theory. 
The goal of this chapter is twofold. First, I propose to review major economic theories of 
the life cycle, describing how individuals plan their lives in a context of risky lifetimes. Second, I 
study the optimal public intervention in that context, under different normative premises. 
Given that life-cycle theory applies to all human decisions where the life horizon of 
decision-makers matters, I will have here to restrict my study to two particular aspects of life: on 
the one hand, consumption and savings decisions; on the other hand, prevention activities. One 
can regard those two aspects as reflecting, respectively, the “quality” and the “quantity” of life. 
Note that this exclusive emphasis on consumption and prevention is restrictive, since life-cycle 
analysis covers many topics (see Browning and Crossley 2011). 
On the normative side, I will also have to restrict my focus. Since Parfit’s (1984) 
canonical work on population ethics, comparisons between allocations are classified in three 
groups: (1) same-number problems (where the comparison concerns situations lived by the same 
population in terms of its size and the identity of the members); (2) different-number problems 
(where the comparison concerns situations lived by populations that differ in terms of size); (3) 
different-identity problems (where the comparison concerns situations lived by populations that 
differ in terms of the identity of their members). As it is well-known, problems of types (2) and 
(3) raise deep difficulties.
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 For the sake of presentation, I will restrict attention to the study of the 
social optimum in the context of longevity-affecting decisions under a fixed group of individuals 
(number and identity). 
But even if one concentrates only on same-number problems, the normative treatment of 
varying lifetimes can rely on various ethical foundations. The normative analysis can, for 
instance, rely on a deontological approach, based on rights and duties, as does Kamm’s (1993). 
Alternatively, one may adopt a teleological approach—that is, focusing on the good—as does 
Broome (2004). It is not possible, because of space constraints, to present all these normative 
approaches to problems of life and death. On the contrary, I will focus here exclusively on a 
normative approach based on social welfare functions (SWFs). More precisely, I will compare 
optimal public policies obtained from two SWFs: on the one hand, the utilitarian SWF, based on 
welfarism, consequentialism, and sum ranking; on the other hand, the egalitarian SWF applied ex 
post, which consists of a maximin on realized lifetime well-being. 
Anticipating the results, I show that the economics literature provides a large variety of 
explanations regarding how individuals allocate their resources along their uncertain lifetime, 
and regarding how they influence their survival chances. On the normative side, I argue that 
there exists a tension between, on the one hand, optimal policies derived from a utilitarian SWF, 
and, on the other hand, optimal policies derived from a nonutilitarian, inequality-sensitive SWF 
applied ex post. Actually, optimal policies under utilitarianism—encouraging savings, 
annuitization, and prevention—increase expected lifetime well-being, but at the cost of reducing 
the realized lifetime well-being of the unlucky short-lived. 
This chapter is organized as follows. As a starting point, section 2 focuses on the 
definition and structure of lifetime well-being. Then section 3 studies an economy where 
individuals face risky lifetimes, and choose their lifetime consumption profile. I review different 
theories of behavior, and discuss the optimal policy under different normative foundations. Then 
section 4 considers a more complex economy where individuals, who still face a risky lifetime, 
can now affect their survival chances through their behavior, and studies preventive policies, 
whose goal is to improve survival conditions, by encouraging healthy behavior or discouraging 
unhealthy behaviors. Conclusions are left to section 5. 
 
2. Lifetime Well-Being: Definition and Structure 
 
2.1. Lifetime Well-Being: Definition 
 
Before considering descriptive and normative challenges raised by risky lifetimes, it is worth 
paying attention to the definition and the formal structure of lifetime well-being. In a nutshell, 
lifetime well-being can be defined as the quantity of well-being associated with a life, as opposed 
to temporal (or instantaneous) well-being, which is the quantity of well-being associated with a 
subperiod (or an instant) of life. In some sense—to be further described below—lifetime well-
being constitutes some form of “lifetime aggregate” of well-being. 
At this early stage of our explorations, it should be stressed that the mere concept of 
lifetime well-being presupposes some form of continuity of human identity over time, that is, that 
a human being remains, in general, one and the same person from birth until death. Without such 
a postulate, referring to someone’s “lifetime” well-being—or to someone’s “lifetime” income or 
“lifetime” consumption—would not make sense. Assuming that a human being remains one and 
the same person from birth until death is not, in general, a strong postulate. As emphasized by 
Adler (2012, 409), the vast literature in contemporary philosophy concerning personal identity 
and its evolution over the lifetime tends to support the general intuition that a human being 
remains one and the same person from birth to death (see McMahan 2003; Broome 2004).
6
 
Regarding the definition of lifetime well-being, another important point to be stressed is 
that there exist not one, but several, concepts of lifetime well-being. A first reason for the 
multiplicity of lifetime well-being concepts lies in the mere fact that there exist different 
concepts of well-being, including, among others, hedonic well-being and preferences-based well-
being. While hedonic well-being refers to how well individuals feel, in line with Bentham’s 
(1789) concept of utility, preferences-based well-being is a mere numerical representation of 
individual’s preferences, in line with Pareto (1909).
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 This second concept of well-being admits 
no trivial relationship with individuals’ feelings and emotions. 
These two concepts of “well-being”—hedonic and preferences-based—lead to distinct 
measures of well-being. At the individual level, these different measures of well-being are often 
correlated (see Clark, chapter 19, this Handbook). Spouses whose measured levels of hedonic 
well-being are low are more likely to divorce, so that measures of hedonic well-being and 
preferences-based well-being tend to be correlated in that context. Similarly, workers with low 
levels of measured hedonic well-being are more likely to leave their jobs, so that measures of 
hedonic well-being and preferences-based well-being are also correlated in that context. Note, 
however, that, even though different measures of well-being may be correlated at the individual 
level, these do not necessarily lead to the same results when comparing the well-being of 
different persons. As shown by Decancq and Neumann in chapter 19 of this Handbook, the 
ranking of individuals in terms of their level of hedonic well-being does not coincide with the 
ranking of individuals in terms of their level of preferences-based well-being. 
 Lifetime well-being can be measured in different ways. First, one can measure lifetime 
well-being in a hedonic way, by summing up, over an individual’s life, its temporary hedonic 
well-being levels. That approach was developed by Veenhoven (1996), under the name of 
“happy life expectancy.” Happy life expectancy is the product of life expectancy at birth with 
average happiness scores (normalized on a 0-1 scale). Note, however, that the computation of 
happy life expectancy implicitly assumes constant happiness during the life, while Blanchflower 
and Oswald (2008) show that happiness exhibits a U-shape through life. 
From a preferences-based perspective, lifetime well-being is a numerical representation 
of individual preferences on possible lives. Thus, the shift from temporary well-being to lifetime 
well-being is here a pure matter of extending the “baskets” of goods and services on which 
individual preferences are defined. Instead of being defined on the baskets of consumption goods 
and activities at a particular point in time, preferences are now defined on profiles of baskets of 
consumption goods and activities during the entire life. In this context, a higher level of lifetime 
well-being means that the life enjoyed by the individual better fits his preferences on possible 
lives. Preferences-based lifetime well-being can be measured by means of constant equivalent-
income profiles.
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 This approach, first developed by Usher (1973), consists of computing the 
hypothetical constant income profile such that, if combined with nonmonetary life features of 
reference, this would make a representative agent indifferent between that hypothetical life and 




2.2. Lifetime Well-Being: Structure 
 
Having discussed the distinction between hedonic and preferences-based lifetime well-being, we 
can now turn to the formal structure of lifetime well-being. When I defined lifetime well-being, I 
argued that this could be regarded as some kind of “aggregate” of well-being along a life. 
Studying the structure of lifetime well-being amounts to examining the form of this aggregate, 
that is, the formal relationship of lifetime well-being with temporal well-being. 
In most economic studies concerned with lifetime well-being, it is assumed that lifetime 
well-being is a mere sum of discounted temporal well-being levels. The discount factor that is 
used may either reflect pure time preferences (i.e., the degree of impatience), or may, in case of 
risky lifetimes, reflect the probabilities of surviving to different ages of life (i.e., biological 
discount factor under the expected utility hypothesis). 
At this stage, it is important to stress that, even if we restrict ourselves to additive lifetime 
well-being, various representations exist in the literature. A first, major dimension on which 
additive formulae differ consists of the postulated time horizon: finite or infinite. Human beings 
have a finite life, but in case of pure altruism toward descendants, the lifetime well-being 
function becomes recursive (i.e., depending on the lifetime well-being of the next generation), 
and repeated substitutions yield a lifetime well-being function that is an infinite sum of weighted 
temporal well-being levels (see Barro and Becker 1989). 
A second dimension concerns the form of discounting. The form of discounting depends 
on the particular type of lifetime well-being considered. If, for instance, lifetime well-being takes 
a hedonic form, the degree to which the level of temporal well-being associated with a given 
period of life is discounted may be related to the strengths or weakness of the mental links 
between that period and the present (see McMahan 2003). If, on the contrary, lifetime well-being 
is preferences based, the form of discounting aims at reflecting individual time preferences. 
Whereas most economic papers still rely on standard exponential discounting, recent studies rely 
on hyperbolic discounting, in such a way as to better fit the data showing the existence of time 
inconsistency (see Laibson 1997).. Finally, note that, in case of dynastic altruism (Barro and 
Becker 1989), the rate of time discounting consists of the altruistic weight assigned by parents to 
their descendants, to a power depending on the distance between parents and their descendants in 
the family tree. 
Although widespread, the discounted time-additive lifetime well-being structure is not 
the unique possible way to aggregate temporal well-being levels. This formal structure exhibits a 
strong degree of substitutability between the temporal well-being levels prevailing at different 
periods of life. For instance, a bad period, characterized by an extremely low level of temporal 
well-being, can be compensated, from the perspective of time-additive lifetime well-being, by a 
much better period, characterized by a higher level of temporal well-being. Such a strong 
substitutability between each period’s well-being is questionable. 
Relaxing that substitutability assumption can modify the formal structure of lifetime 
well-being. One can, for instance, rewrite lifetime well-being as a product of temporal well-
being levels, as does Broome (2004, 227). Under such a product, the degree of substitutability 
between the temporal well-being levels associated with different periods is limited. If, for 
instance, one period of life is characterized by an extremely undesirable event, yielding a level of 
temporal well-being equal to 0 under the prevailing measurement scale, then the lifetime well-
being is also equal to 0. Under a product of temporal well-being levels, the level of lifetime well-
being is strongly sensitive to the occurrence of an extremely undesirable event, since 
substitutability is now limited. 
When the degree of substitutability between the temporal well-being levels achieved in 
each life period is set to 0—that is, perfect complementarity—the level of lifetime well-being 
becomes equal to the minimum of all temporal well-being levels achieved during a life. Under 
this formula, a bad life period cannot be compensated by other, better life periods: there is no 
substitutability. On the contrary, one could assign a full weight to the highest level of temporal 
well-being achieved during the life. In that case, lifetime well-being would be defined as the 
maximum of all temporal well-being levels. Such an alternative concept of lifetime well-being 
regards life periods as perfectly redundant: a life is here reduced to its “best days,” while the rest 
of life does not matter from the perspective of lifetime well-being. This approach can be called 
the “peak” approach (see Broome 2004, 228). Alternatively, one could adopt a hybrid form of 
lifetime well-being, which combines a concern for the best period of life with a concern for the 
last period of life. That approach, first studied in Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin (1997, 381), is 
known as the “peak and end” approach, where lifetime well-being is defined as the sum of the 
maximum level of temporal well-being plus the temporal well-being associated with the last 
period of life (see Broome 2004, 228). 
Obviously, perfect complementarity and redundancy of life periods are polar cases, 
which make lifetime well-being dependent only on what happens during some particular 
subperiods of life. The major problem with such functional forms is to make lifetime well-being 
insensitive to what happens during almost all periods of life. This limitation may explain why the 
economics literature has mainly focused on the time-additive lifetime well-being structure. 
However, several recent criticisms have been raised against the standard time-additive lifetime 
well-being structure. 
A first theoretical criticism of time-additive lifetime well-being concerns the limited 
capacity of this formal structure to reflect the value of longevity. This point is discussed in detail 
by Broome (2004, ch. 7). The question raised is the following: where does the value of longevity 
appear in the formal representation of lifetime well-being? 
In order to answer this question, it is first necessary to define what is meant by the “value 
of longevity.” Broome (2004, 108) defines it as follows. Suppose that some total amount of time 
is lived by people, at some level of temporal well-being. Longevity is valued if it is better for the 
time to be divided up among fewer lives rather than among more lives. Thus, longevity is valued 
if, for a given amount of temporal well-being per period and a given total time, it is better that 
time is concentrated on a smaller number of lives. When reformulated purely in terms of the 
structure of lifetime well-being, that condition states that, in the context of a unique life, 
longevity is valued if the increase in lifetime well-being from extending that life by a period is an 
increasing function of the duration of that life. 
Under time-additive lifetime well-being, the addition of one life period is valued only 
through the level of temporal well-being associated with that additional life period. As a 
consequence (and abstracting from time discounting), the addition of one life period with a given 
level of temporal well-being has the same value, from the point of view of additive lifetime well-
being, independently of the past duration of life. For instance, adding a life period with some 
level of temporal well-being has the same effect on the lifetime well-being of a person, whether 
this segment of life is added to a newborn person or to a 90-year-old person. This goes against 
valuing longevity in Broome’s sense. Note, however, that under multiplicative lifetime well-
being, the addition of a life period with some given level of temporal well-being would not have, 
in general, the same effects on individuals of different ages, suggesting that the criticism based 
on the value of longevity does not affect all forms of lifetime well-being representations. 
Although the standard, time-additive, representation of lifetime well-being does not do 
justice to the value of longevity, it is nonetheless possible, thanks to some modifications, to make 
lifetime well-being inclusive of the value of longevity. For this purpose, a simple solution 
consists of making longevity part of temporal well-being at every time of life. This strategy, 
explored by Broome (2004, 110), consists of dispersing the value of longevity. The intuition 
behind such dispersion is that humans, throughout their lives, undertake projects, which take 
time to be completed. As a consequence, the contribution of a life project to lifetime well-being 
depends on the total time spent on it. The dispersion of the value of longevity does justice to that 
intuition. To achieve dispersion, one can add, to the level of temporal well-being associated with 
each life period, some positive amount of well-being that is proportional to the total duration of 
life. Thanks to dispersion, longevity is valued, since the addition of a life period generates now a 
larger rise in lifetime well-being if the person benefiting from the extra period has a longer life. It 
follows from this that the first criticism—the incapacity of the time-additive form of lifetime 
well-being to reflect the value of longevity—can be overcome by dispersing the value of 
longevity across all periods lived. Note, however, that such dispersion requires going beyond the 
standard time-additive representation, and also faces the difficulties associated with the 
calibration of the extra amounts of well-being to be added at each period of life. 
A second theoretical criticism against time-additive lifetime well-being, which relies on a 
preferences-based concept of well-being, supports the introduction of limited substitutability 
between the temporal well-being levels associated with different life periods. This criticism was 
formulated by Bommier in different pieces of work (see Bommier 2006, 2007, 2010). Bommier 
argued that if individual preferences on lotteries of life satisfy the expected utility hypothesis 
(i.e., can be represented by a weighted sum of the well-being of each scenario of the lottery, 
weighted by its probability of occurrence), if lifetime well-being is time-additive (with zero 
discounting), and if consumption per period of life is constant along the life cycle, then 
individuals must be indifferent between lotteries of life characterized by the same life expectancy 
and the same constant consumption profiles, even though these lotteries differ on the variance of 
longevity. That phenomenon is known as the net risk neutrality with respect to the duration of 
life. 
Net risk neutrality with respect to the duration of life implies, for instance, that a person 
is indifferent between, on the one hand, a life with a sure duration of 80 years and, on the other 
hand, a lottery with a probability ½ of dying at the age of 60 years, and a probability ½ of dying 
at the age of 100 years (consumption profiles being assumed to be flat in all cases). This result is 
quite counterintuitive, since one expects that individuals are likely to prefer the certainty of 
living 80 years over the lottery involving a probability ½ of dying at age 60. To put it differently, 
it is likely that individuals exhibit some form of risk aversion with respect to the duration of life, 
instead of risk neutrality. If this is true, the time-additive measure of lifetime well-being is 
questionable. 
As a consequence, Bommier proposed a new formal structure for lifetime well-being, 
allowing for risk aversion with respect to the duration of life: a concave transform of the sum of 
temporal well-being levels. The standard time-additive case coincides with the case of a linear 
transform, which is responsible for the implausible property of risk neutrality with respect to the 
duration of life. Once that linear transform is replaced by a concave transform, risk neutrality 
does no longer occur, and agents opt for the lottery with the lower variance for lifetime. 
Although Bommier’s solution is attractive and has given rise to many applications (see 
Bommier, Leroux, and Lozachmeur 2011a, 2011b), it is important to stress that it does not 
constitute the unique way to escape from risk neutrality with respect to the duration of life. One 
can, for instance, obtain risk aversion with respect to the duration of life by merely replacing the 
expected-utility hypothesis by a non-expected-utility framework, while keeping a standard time-
additive lifetime well-being.
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 Hence, although Bommier’s criticism points to a fundamental 
limitation of the standard representation of individual preferences on lotteries of life, it is not 
obvious that it definitely leads to the rejection of the time-additive lifetime well-being formula. 
One may reconcile Bommier’s criticism with the additive model, while changing other 
assumptions. 
Summarizing, the standard time-additive model suffers from some limitations: a high 
degree of substitutability between temporal well-being levels, a limited capacity to reflect the 
value of longevity, and a tendency to lead to (implausible) risk neutrality with respect to the 
duration of life. However, despite such criticisms, the time-additive model remains the most 
widespread framework in economics, probably because of its simplicity. This is the reason why 
the rest of this survey relies on it, except in a few cases. It should be stressed, nevertheless, that 
deviations from the standard time-additive model may significantly affect descriptive and 
normative conclusions. These deviations remain largely—except for a few exceptions—on the 
research agenda of life-cycle economists. 
 
3. Consumption, Savings. and Risky Lifetimes 
 
3.1. Consumption Profiles: Behavior 
 
Having examined the definition and structure of lifetime well-being, let us now concentrate on a 
major pillar of life-cycle theory: the study of the relation between lifetime well-being and 
consumption profiles. Various empirical studies examined the shape of individuals’ consumption 
profile over their life cycle (see Poterba 1994; Lee and Tuljapurkar 1997; Börsch-Suspan 2003; 
Gourinchas and Parker 2002; Jappelli and Modigliani 2005). All these studies found—
approximately—the same result: the lifetime consumption profile exhibits an inverted-U shape, 
with a maximum around 45–50 years. 
How can economic theory explain those profiles? To answer this question, it may be 
worth describing what life-cycle theory says about consumption along life. Life-cycle theory first 
appeared in the economics literature under the form of the life-cycle hypothesis (Modigliani and 
Ando 1963) and of the permanent income hypothesis (Friedman 1957).
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 According to this 
theory, individuals allocate their resources along their life so as to maximize their lifetime well-
being, subject to their lifetime budget constraint. The shape of the lifetime consumption profile 
then depends on three factors: (1) the consumers’ preferences (in particular their time 
preferences, that is, how they weight future well-being in comparison to current well-being); (2) 
the interest rate; (3) the duration of life. 
Under the life-cycle hypothesis, the precise way in which individuals use their resources 
over time depends on the postulated functional form for lifetime well-being. Given that lifetime 
well-being takes, most often, the form of a discounted sum of temporal well-being levels, which 
are themselves increasing and concave in temporal consumption, it follows from this that the 
optimal consumption profile generally involves no large fluctuations over the life cycle. The 
intuition behind the consumption smoothing phenomenon lies in the fact that large fluctuations 
in consumption over time would, under the concavity of temporal well-being in consumption, 
lead to a smaller lifetime well-being level in comparison with what would prevail under a 
smoother consumption profile. As a consequence, life-cycle theory predicts that individual 
consumption must, along the life cycle, exhibit a lower volatility than individual income. 
Actually, lifetime well-being maximization implies that individuals tend to save when they are 
working (i.e., their income being larger than their consumption), while they stop saving once 
retired (i.e., their income being then smaller than their consumption). 
While early life-cycle theory presupposed a fixed lifetime known by individuals, Yaari 
(1965) extended the study of consumption profiles to the more realistic context of uncertain 
lifetimes, and studied how individuals choose to consume their wealth during their unknown 
lifetime. Yaari assumed that individual preferences on lotteries of life satisfy the expected utility 
hypothesis, and considered two institutional environments: one where there exists no market for 
annuities and one where such a market exists. By definition, annuities give a right to an income 
flow conditionally on survival, and, accordingly, can constitute a good insurance against a long 
life (i.e., the risk of becoming poor in case of survival to the old age). 
Considering first the economy without annuities, Yaari shows that the introduction of 
risky lifetimes tends, in comparison to the benchmark model without risk, to increase the rate of 
time preferences for the present for most people, except for those who have loved descendants. 
Indeed, the perspective of possible death tomorrow is likely to make individuals consume more 
now (and thus to make them more impatient), because individuals are likely to want to avoid 
savings losses due to premature death.
12
 In other words, the risk of dying early acts here as a 
“biological” discount factor, which reinforces human impatience. 
Then, turning to the economy with an annuities market (which is supposed to be 
actuarially fair), Yaari shows that, provided individuals have no will to leave bequests, it is 
optimal for them to convert their entire savings into annuities.
13
 The existence of an annuity 
market thus involves a well-being gain for agents. As a consequence of full annuitization, the 
lifetime income profile of individuals reveals a lower degree of impatience than the profile 
without annuities (but keeps the same monotonicity, i.e., either increasing or decreasing). 
Real-world consumption profiles do not look like the consumption profiles prevailing 
under Yaari’s model. Annuity markets are underdeveloped in most countries of the world. 
Johnson, Burman, and Kobes (2004) report that only 5% of people older than 65 buy annuities in 
the United States, which is far below the predictions of Yaari’s model.
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 The strong contrast 
between the predictions of Yaari’s model and the real world is known as the annuity puzzle. 
Various explanations are given for that puzzle (see Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond 2005; 
Benartzi, Previtero, and Thaler 2011). Some explanations lie on the supply side of the annuity 
market: Poterba (2001) showed that the price of annuities is higher than the actuarially fair price 
(> 10%–15%), unlike in Yaari’s world. Another possible explanation lies on the demand side: 
the role of the family as an insurance. Indeed, as shown by Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981), the 
family acts as an informal insurance company offering implicit contracts, thus insuring 
individuals against risk about date of death. The advantage of such implicit contracts is that there 
is, in the family, a higher degree of information and trust, which reduces the standard problems 
faced in insurance markets (moral hazard and adverse selection).
15
 Another explanation, still on 
the family side, would be individuals’ will to leave bequests. This hypothesis is confirmed by 
Brown (2001), who shows that individuals who consider that leaving a bequest is important have 
a lower probability of buying annuities.
16
 However, this result is in contradiction with a previous 
study by Hurd (1989), who showed that most bequests are involuntary, since the marginal utility 
of the money that is given to descendants seems to be very low. Besides the family, another 
possible explanation for the annuity puzzle may be the role of the state as a Good Samaritan. 
According to this explanation, the low degree of annuitization would result from the fact that 
individuals rely on the state to help them in case of old-age poverty. 
While these explanations presuppose rational agents with standard preferences, there also 
exist behavioral explanations of the annuity puzzle. Holmer (2003) analyzed the demand for 
annuities in a framework where individuals are not expected utility maximizers (unlike in Yaari 
1965), but behave as in prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).
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 Holmer concludes that, 
under prospect theory, annuities seem less attractive (because of an overestimate of the 
probability of death before retirement). Another possible explanation is flow aversion. 
Fetherstonhaugh and Ross (1999) asked respondents to choose between, on the one hand, an 
annuity plan, and, on the other hand, a mix made of a smaller annuity and of a given (immediate) 
amount of cash. Although the two options had been computed to yield the same expected total 
wealth, 75% of individuals preferred the second option. 
There is a simpler explanation to the annuity puzzle: individuals tend, for various 
reasons, to save too little for their old days, making annuities useless. Insufficient savings may 
come from the environment in which individuals live (imperfect markets), which would prevent 
them from achieving consumption smoothing. A first possible explanation lies in the existence of 
liquidity constraints (Deaton 1991): under liquidity constraints, consumption at the young age is 
lower than at higher ages, because of lower wages early in the career. 
Alternatively, recent studies provided several behavioral explanations for individuals’ 
tendency to save too little for their old days. A first explanation consists of myopia—that is, the 
incapacity to take the future into account (see Feldstein 1985; Feldstein and Liebman 2002; 
Cremer et al. 2008). A second explanation for undersaving consists of time inconsistency due to 
hyperbolic discounting—that is, agents valuing the future, but being unable to commit 
themselves to any savings (Thaler 1981; Laibson 1998; Angeletos et al. 2001; Diamond and 
Koszegi 2003).
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 Under time inconsistency, there is a conflict between current and future selves. 
Current selves cannot commit themselves to save for the sake of achieving a distant goal in the 
future: avoiding old-age poverty. Another explanation for insufficient saving may be a human 
tendency toward prodigality (see Homburg 2000; Pestieau and Possen 2008). In all those cases, 
undersaving is regarded as the outcome of some kind of behavioral imperfection, which prevents 
individuals from acting in a way maximizing their lifetime well-being. 
In sum, life-cycle theory, which generally assumes that lifetime well-being takes the form 
of a sum of discounted temporal well-being levels, supports annuitization and (relatively) 
smoothed consumption profiles. These predictions do not fit the data. However, it is possible to 
reconcile the theory with facts by assuming various deviations from the standard representation 
of human behavior (e.g., myopia, time inconsistency, etc.). 
 
3.2. Consumption Profiles: Policy 
 
Should governments intervene regarding individual lifetime consumption profiles? The answer 
depends on whether individual lifetime consumption profiles under laissez-faire coincide or not 
with the profiles at the social optimum. In order to derive optimal policies, it is first necessary to 
define a social objective. It can, under some conditions, be formalized by a social welfare 
function (SWF), which can take various forms, depending on the ethical postulates or axioms 
from which the SWF is derived (see Weymark, chapter 5, this Handbook). For the sake of 
presentation, I will, in this section, contrast the optimal policies obtained under two distinct kinds 
of SWF: first, the standard utilitarian SWF (based on Bentham 1789); second, nonutilitarian, 
inequality-sensitive SWFs of the maximin type (based on Rawls 1971). 
Let us first consider the utilitarian SWF. A key feature of the utilitarian SWF is that it 
satisfies the ex ante Pareto principle, according to which, if an allocation yields a larger level of 
expected lifetime well-being for some individual than another allocation, while it leaves other 
individuals with the same expected lifetime well-being level than in another allocation, then that 
allocation must be socially preferred to the other allocation. 
An important corollary of the ex ante Pareto principle in the present context concerns the 
treatment of behavioral mistakes in the context of savings decisions. When individuals make 
such mistakes—either because of myopia, time inconsistency, or prodigality—they do not 
behave in a way that maximizes their expected lifetime well-being. As a consequence of those 
suboptimal behaviors, there exists a gap between laissez-faire and the social optimum. That gap 
requires some public intervention, as argued in the recent “behavioral” public economics 
(Camerer et al. 2003; O’Donoghe and Rabbin 2003; Thaler and Sunstein 2003). 
When individuals tend to save less than what would have maximized their lifetime well-
being, this individual tendency toward undersaving can be corrected by means of some 
commitment device forcing agents to save more than what they would have saved without state 
intervention. Such a commitment device can take the form of a social security system that forces 
young individuals to save by taxing their incomes, and then uses such fiscal revenues to fund the 
pensions of the old. This system is regarded as an institutional remedy against individual 
behavioral imperfections (either myopia, or time inconsistency, or prodigality). Alternatively, the 
government can encourage savings by appropriate savings subsidies, inducing individuals to save 
more in comparison with laissez-faire. 
The underlying justification for government intervention is that, in the absence of 
intervention, individuals would save too little and then be poor in old age. In other words, 
individuals would, in the absence of policy, fail to maximize their expected lifetime well-being. 
Once old and poor, individuals would then realize their mistakes and would regret their past 
behaviors. Public policy would thus prevent the emergence of regrets, by encouraging 
individuals to save more when they are young, through a mandatory pensions system or a 
subsidy on savings. Note that the pension system associated with the forced savings system 
solves the other problem identified above: it is formally similar to an annuity system, since it 
provides constant resources conditionally on survival. Hence one can regard (compulsory) 
pensions systems as forcing individuals both to save more and to annuitize their savings, unlike 
what prevails under laissez-faire. Social security is, in this context, a remedy for some form of 
human myopia (Feldstein 1985; Feldstein and Liebman 2002). 
Hence, from the perspective of the ex ante Pareto principle—and, thus, of the utilitarian 
SWF—behavioral mistakes should be corrected, and saving and annuitization should be 
promoted by public policies. Note, however, that such policies do not generally suffice to 
decentralize the utilitarian social optimum. Utilitarianism also requires some transfers across 
individuals, aimed at equalizing the marginal expected lifetime well-being across individuals, in 
order to maximize the utilitarian social objective. 
Bommier, Leroux, and Lozachmeur (2011a, 2011b) considered the utilitarian social 
planning problem in an economy à la Yaari (1965) where rational (i.e., nonmyopic) individuals 
face risk about the duration of their life and choose how to allocate a given endowment of 
resources over their life cycle. At the utilitarian optimum (and assuming away pure discounting), 
consumptions are, under time-additive lifetime well-being, equalized across all life periods, so 
that individuals who enjoy a longer life also benefit from more resources than those who have a 
shorter life. Hence, starting from an initial situation where resources are distributed equally, the 
equalization of consumption per period per person consists of transferring resources from the 
young age to the old age of life. However, given that some individuals die before reaching the 
old age, such a transfer is equivalent to transferring resources from short-lived agents toward 
long-lived agents. 
It should be stressed here that this direction of transfers is attenuated when lifetime well-
being takes a nonadditive form, in such a way as to account for net risk aversion with respect to 
the length of life (see supra). Hence, the form of the utilitarian social optimum is affected by the 
postulated structure of lifetime well-being. Note, however, that utilitarianism still tends, to some 
extent, to redistribute from short-lived toward long-lived agents, even when lifetime well-being 
is defined as a concave transform of the sum of temporal well-being levels (see Leroux and 
Ponthiere 2013). 
Such transfers from short-lived toward long-lived agents are quite counterintuitive: they 
induce a kind of double penalty for the short-lived. Short-lived persons are penalized first by 
nature (their shorter life reduces the maximum achievable lifetime well-being for a given amount 
of resources) and additionally by Bentham (since utilitarianism requires them to transfer 
resources toward the longer-lived). 
Many find that utilitarianism leads to counterintuitive outcomes in situations where 
individuals are heterogeneous. As Mirrlees (1982) underlined, utilitarianism can, at most, be 
taken as an ethical benchmark when the population under study is fully homogeneous. However, 
once agents differ on fundamental characteristics, utilitarianism can lead to quite counterintuitive 
consequences. This is true for handicapped persons, whose lower marginal utilities make them 
penalized under utilitarianism (see Arrow 1971 and Sen 1973). But this is also true for short-
lived agents, whose shorter lifetime reduces their capacity to transform resources in terms of 
well-being (except under linear temporal well-being functions). 
Let us now consider the optimal resource allocation under risky lifetimes, but under an 
egalitarian SWF. At this stage, it is worth underlining that there exist, in the literature, various 
ways to be egalitarian from a life-cycle perspective. The most widespread approach consists of 
trying to minimize inequalities in well-being from the perspective of lives taken as a whole. This 
“complete view” is the approach adopted in the rest of this section. Note, however, that one may 
rather argue that equality should not only concern lives taken as a whole, but, also, all sublives, 
that is, all segments of the lives under comparison. That alternative egalitarian approach, 
developed by McKerlie (1989), is more demanding than the approach adopted in this chapter, 
which allows for inequalities in well-being in different sublives, as long as these tend to 
counteract each other, leading to perfect equality at the level of the whole life.
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In the rest of this section, the social objective consists of a nonutilitarian, inequality-
sensitive SWF defined in terms of individual well-being over the entire life. Such a SWF may or 
may not satisfy the ex ante Pareto principle. If, for instance, the SWF to be maximized is the 
minimum expected lifetime well-being within the population, then the ex ante Pareto principle is 
satisfied. If, on the contrary, we take as a SWF the minimum realized lifetime well-being within 
the population, then the ex ante Pareto principle does not hold any more. 
To illustrate this, let us now consider the social planning problem studied in Fleurbaey, 
Leroux, and Ponthiere (2014). They consider the optimal allocation of resources in an economy 
with risky lifetimes, while adopting an ex post egalitarian social objective (specifically, one of 
the maximin form). They identify the conditions under which short-lived persons can be 
compensated so that the realized lifetime well-being levels of short-lived and long-lived persons 
may be equal. 
At first glance, the compensation of short-lived persons seems impossible. Ex ante (i.e., 
before the duration of life of each person is known), short-lived persons can hardly be identified. 
Ex ante information consists of life tables, which give us information at the group level. 
However, since compensation requires information on realized longevity at the individual level, 
life tables are not suitable for the compensation of individuals for shorter realized lifetime. Note 
also that, ex post, the compensation of short-lived persons cannot be carried out. Hence 
compensating the short-lived seems to be impossible. 
Nonetheless, Fleurbaey, Leroux, and Ponthiere (2014) show that such a compensation for 
premature death can be carried out, by promoting the consumption of resources early in the life 
cycle. The ex post egalitarian optimum equalizes realized lifetime well-being across all 
individuals, short-lived and long-lived, by setting old-age consumption to a level that makes 
individuals indifferent between, on the one hand, further life with that consumption, and, on the 
other hand, death. Such a “neutral” consumption level is the one that makes temporal well-being 
equal to the neutral well-being level for continuing life (see Broome 2004). Given that the 
“neutral” consumption is quite low (see Becker, Philipson, and Soares 2005), this social 
optimum involves, in general, decreasing consumption profiles along the life cycle. 
At the policy level, adopting an ex post egalitarian SWF has strong consequences: instead 
of redistributing resources from short-lived toward long-lived agents as under utilitarianism, the 
policy consists here of taxing savings so as to transfer resources from the old to the young, that 
is, from the lucky long-lived to the (potentially) unlucky short-lived. 
Note, however, that the equalization of realized lifetime well-being across short-lived and 
long-lived agents has a cost: the violation of the ex ante Pareto principle. To see this, it suffices 
to note that ex ante individually optimal insurance decisions—such as the purchase of actuarially 
fair annuities—may not be optimal under an ex post egalitarian social objective. Although 
buying annuities may increase expected lifetime well-being ex ante, redistributing the savings of 
the prematurely dead to the surviving old through annuities tends to increase inequalities in 
realized lifetime well-being between the short-lived and the long-lived, and, accordingly, cannot 
be optimal from an ex post egalitarian perspective. 
Another aspect by which ex post equality may conflict with ex ante Pareto efficiency 
concerns the treatment of myopic behavior. From an ex ante perspective, it is worth correcting 
behavioral mistakes, in such a way as to increase expected lifetime well-being prospects. 
However, correcting for myopia can increase inequalities in realized lifetime well-being. To see 
this, take the case of a myopic person who turns out to be short-lived. Since he dies prematurely, 
encouraging him to save would be a pure waste of resources from an ex post perspective. 
Hence, if one adopts an ex post egalitarian view, myopia, time inconsistency, and 
prodigality are no longer necessarily problematic. On the contrary, from the perspective of ex 
post egalitarians, those “behavioral mistakes” may have positive effects, since these allow 
unlucky short-lived persons to minimize losses in realized lifetime well-being caused by 
premature mortality. This is the reason why ex post egalitarians may, quite paradoxically, 
welcome those behavioral mistakes. 
The incompatibility between ex ante Pareto efficiency and ex post equality is not specific 
to the optimal allocation of resources under risky lifetimes. As discussed in detail by Mongin and 
Pivato (chapter 24, this Handbook), this incompatibility between ex ante Pareto efficiency and ex 
post egalitarianism constitutes a general result in the literature on social choice under risk. 
Allowing for all ex ante Pareto improvements—including, in our context, the supply of insurance 
contracts and annuitization, as well as the correction of behavioral mistakes—can go against the 
equalization of realized lifetime well-being across all individuals. 
Note, however, that the extent to which the utilitarian and the ex post egalitarian social 
optima—and the associated policies—differ depends on the postulated form of lifetime well-
being. The standard, time-additive form of lifetime well-being tends to exacerbate the differences 
between the two optima, in comparison to a decision framework with positive risk aversion with 
respect to the duration of life. 
 
4. Prevention and Risky Lifetimes 
 
4.1. Prevention Profiles: Behaviors 
 
Longevity inequalities are partly determined by exogenous factors, over which individuals have 
no control. For instance, according to Christensen, Johnson, and Vaupel (2006), genetic 
background contributes to about 25% to 30% of longevity inequalities within cohorts. However, 
recent studies also highlight that individuals can, by their behavior, affect their survival chances. 
For instance, Balia and Jones (2008) show, on the basis of a longitudinal study of premature 
death in Great Britain, that individual lifestyles predict about 25% of overall inequality in 
mortality, with strong contributions of smoking and sleeping patterns.
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This production of health and longevity has given rise to much theoretical work. The 
canonical model in this literature is the life-cycle model of health production by Grossman 
(1972). Grossman’s model presents the health of individuals as a “health capital” stock, which 
depreciates as the individual becomes older. In that model, individuals choose their health 
investment in such a way as to maximize their lifetime well-being, subject to the constraint 
describing the dynamics of the health capital stock across the life cycle. Individuals’ investments 
in their health capital are costly (since they reduce temporal consumption), but they reduce also 
the depreciation of the health capital, and, hence, allow individuals to postpone their death (death 
occurring when the health capital stock falls below the minimal subsistence level).
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Grossman model can also be modified to take into account the effect of lifestyles on health and 
longevity: the health capital depreciation may be reduced by preventive investment but increased 
by unhealthy activities, such as the consumption of “sin goods,” defined as goods whose 
consumption brings immediate satisfaction, but which have bad effects on health and survival 
chances, such as cigarettes, alcohol, and fatty food (see Case and Deaton 2005). There exist also 
extensions of the Grossman model with risky longevity, such as by Picone, Uribe, and Wilson 
(1998) and Asano and Shibata (2011). 
Those models of health production have largely relied on the rationality axiom, according 
to which individuals choose actions that are the best for them, while fully taking into account the 
consequences of their actions. Such a rationality axiom seems to be a weak postulate when 
considering simple choices, but this becomes a much stronger hypothesis when considering more 
complex choices. This can be illustrated by considering the decision to consume some goods, 
such as cigarettes and alcohol, which not only have the property of harming health, but also have 
another feature: these are addictive goods, that is, goods whose consumption now increases the 
marginal utility from future consumption of those goods. The reinforcement property of 
addictive goods may be either ignored by consumers—in which case there is a myopic 
addiction—or taken into account by consumers in their decisions—that is, the case of a rational 
addiction (Becker and Murphy 1988). 
To what extent do those models explain actual risk-taking behaviors? Empirical evidence 
surveyed in Cawley and Ruhm (2012) shows that risky health behaviors, such as smoking, 
drinking, drug use, and poor diet remain nowadays major sources of premature death. For 
instance, about 467,000 deaths were related to tobacco smoking in the United States in 2005. 
That figure seems surprising, since public health studies showing the negative impact of 
cigarettes on health, which date back to work by Doll and Hill (1950), have become increasingly 
disseminated among the population. The same observation could be made regarding other—
largely documented—risky behaviors.
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 The large prevalence of risky behaviors is quite hard to 
reconcile with the standards models of rational decision-making presented above. 
One possibility to reconcile the observed prevalence of risky unhealthy behaviors with 
the theory consists of assuming that individuals’ preferences are such that little weight is 
assigned to the future. Indeed, as underlined by Fuchs (1982), the bad effect of risky unhealthy 
behaviors will take place at higher ages of life, whereas the good effect takes place now. Hence 
one way to rationalize the observed behavior is to assume that individuals have strong 
impatience. Note, however, that one could provide the inverse explanation, in line with Becker 
and Mulligan (1997). Bad health is not only the consequence of strong impatience; it is also its 
cause: bad health in the future, by reducing the incentives to invest in patience, leads to higher 
impatience, which in turn leads to less investment in health. 
The large prevalence of unhealthy risky behaviors can also be explained by the presence 
of time inconsistency, that is, the difficulty of committing oneself to achieving a goal in the 
future. That explanation differs from the previous one, on the grounds that, under time 
inconsistency, individuals assign a low weight to future well-being, but regret it later on. Gruber 
and Koszegi (2000, 2001) applied the concept of time inconsistency to the consumption of 
addictive goods. The explanation based on time inconsistency is particularly relevant for 
unhealthy behavior. Cigarettes and alcohol are not only addictive goods; these are also “sin 
goods,” that is, goods that bring immediate satisfaction, but at the cost of a future worsening of 
health. In comparison to standard goods, the large amount of immediate satisfaction derived 
from the consumption of sin goods encourages individuals to consume those goods in larger 
quantities, which yields larger health damages later on in their life. As it was stressed by 
O’Donoghe and Rabbin (2003, 2006), time inconsistency is likely to be even more severe in the 
context of sin goods, because of the large immediate satisfaction given by their consumption. 
This explanation is quite plausible, since there exists a large prevalence of regrets among 
consumers of sin goods. For instance, phone surveys by Slovic (2001) reveal that, in the United 




 Models of multiple selves can also be used to understand unhealthy risky behavior. In 
those models, such as Thaler and Shefrin’s (1981), individual consumption choices reveal an 
internal conflict between a myopic self wanting immediate satisfaction, and a planner self, who 
has a longer time horizon. In the context of health-related actions, the myopic self would 
definitely opt for the consumption of sin goods, since these bring immediate satisfaction, while 
the planner self would recommend less sin good consumption and more prevention. Another 
model of multiple selves is the one by Bernheim and Rangel (2004), where the human mind can 
belong to two distinct states: the “hot” state or the “cold” state. When in a cold state, individuals 
are rational planners making detailed cost-benefit analysis. By contrast, individuals in the hot 
state do not make any calculus, and follow their instantaneous desires. Here again, the model can 
fit the observed prevalence of risky behaviors. Individuals in a hot state do not care at all about 
their future health and longevity, and consume sin goods. Inversely, individuals in the cold state 
do care about their remaining lifetime, and act accordingly. 
Unhealthy risky behaviors can also be explained by individual myopia. Individuals may 
underestimate the danger associated with some unhealthy lifestyle, such as smoking or drinking, 
and this may explain the large prevalence of unhealthy lifestyles, in line with the psychological 
literature showing that individuals tend to believe what they like, and thus to underestimate the 
likelihood of bad events (like death).
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Whereas the above behavioral explanations share the postulate of a self-oriented agent, 
one can also explain the observed prevalence of unhealthy risky behaviors by the existence of 
peer effects. The underlying idea behind peer-effects models is that individuals choose their 
actions in order to conform to the social norm (see Manski 2000; Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 
2005). Hence, if those in one’s social neighborhood smoke, the individual will choose to smoke, 
and this has nothing to do with a taste for smoking per se: individuals act in such a way as to 
reproduce or mimic the behavior of others in the network. Such an attitude is known as the 
bandwagon effect, following Simon’s early work on voting behavior in response to electoral 




Alternatively, unhealthy risky behavior can also be explained by imperfect or bounded 
rationality, in line with other pioneer works by Simon (1955, 1984). According to those 
behavioral models of choice, individuals want to maximize some objective, but gathering the 
relevant information is costly, so that individuals will opt for a satisfying action, but not for the 
one that would ideally have maximized their well-being. Within Simon’s model, a central role is 
played by individuals’ cognitive capacities, since these determine the cost of gathering the 
relevant information. In the context of health-related choices, an obvious corollary of models of 
bounded rationality is that individuals with low education will face larger costs of gathering 
information about healthy lifestyles, and are thus more likely to adopt unhealthy behaviors. 
 
4.2. Prevention Profiles: Policies 
 
Let us now consider what the government should do when facing unhealthy risky behaviors. For 
the sake of presentation, I will, as in section 3.2, contrast the optimal policies obtained under two 
distinct kinds of SWF: first, the standard utilitarian SWF; second, the egalitarian SWF applied ex 
post. 
Given that the utilitarian SWF satisfies the ex ante Pareto principle, this social objective 
pays particular attention to the correction of behavioral mistakes that prevent individuals from 
maximizing their expected lifetime well-being. When individual risk-taking (or lack of 
prevention) is not the outcome of agents’ fully rational optimization program, but is rather the 
outcome of imperfect decision-making as described above, the ex ante Pareto principle 
legitimates the correction of behavioral imperfections, which will lead individuals to regret their 
past choices (Besley 1989). This behavioral motive for public intervention has been much 
studied in the recent years (Camerer et al. 2003; O’Donoghe and Rabbin 2003; Thaler and 
Sunstein 2003). The intuition behind such policies goes as follows. If, for instance, individuals 
suffer from time inconsistency, myopia, or bounded rationality, they will, once old, be grateful to 
the government for having, through public policies, prevented them from making mistakes that 
they would have otherwise regretted. Hence governments intervene, in order to avoid the 
occurrence of frustrations, regrets, or inconsistencies. 
Public intervention can take various forms. A standard policy instrument consists of taxes 
and subsidies, whose goal is to distort the prices of goods, in such a way as to make individuals 
choose what will turn out to be the best for them. Gruber and Koszegi (2000, 2001) study the 
optimal tax of addictive sin goods (in particular cigarettes) in the presence of time-inconsistent 
agents. The authors argue that taxing sin goods can serve as a self-control device for time-
inconsistent individuals and recommend, on behavioral grounds, a one-dollar rise of the tax on 
cigarettes. Optimal taxes on sin goods are also studied by O’Donoghe and Rabbin (2003, 2006), 




The effect of sin taxes on behavior is debated in the empirical literature. As stressed by 
Cawley and Ruhm (2012), sin taxes are often regressive: sin goods are in greater proportion 
consumed by individuals with lower education and lower incomes. Moreover, those taxes can 
have other perverse effects. For instance, taxing cigarettes may push teenagers toward other, less 
taxed, sin goods, such as illicit drugs. Furthermore, the effect of taxes may be relatively small. 
For instance, Carpenter et al. (2007) showed that a 1% rise in the tax on beers contributes to 
reducing the consumption of teenagers by only 1%. 
Whether a given policy instrument is successful or not depends on the particular 
behavioral imperfection that is at the origin of the excessive risk taking. If, for instance, 
individual behavior is driven by peer effects, then small taxes on sin goods may be sufficient to 
have a large effect on the overall prevalence of some unhealthy behavior. If, on the contrary, 
excessive risk-taking is due to a strong time inconsistency, small taxes may not suffice to 
decentralize the social optimum. The mixed effect of fiscal instruments has led economists to 
consider other possible interventions: partial prohibitions, limitations of advertising for sin goods 
(Saffer and Chaloupka 2000), and instantaneous rewards for buying healthy goods (Cawley and 
Price 2011). Yet another road for public intervention consists of nudging (Thaler and Sunstein 
2008). Nudging means, for instance, reshaping the architecture of choices faced by individuals, 
in such a way as to include, as default option, the option that maximizes their expected lifetime 
well-being. Such a reshaping of the menu could favor the adoption of healthier lifestyles. 
Hence, from the perspective of the ex ante Pareto principle—and, hence, of the utilitarian 
SWF—excessive risk-taking should be corrected by preventive public policies. However, as was 
noted above in the context of savings policy, such interventions do not, in general, suffice to 
decentralize the utilitarian social optimum. Clearly, utilitarianism also requires some transfers 
across individuals, aimed at equalizing the marginal expected lifetime well-being across 
individuals. 
Leroux, Pestieau, and Ponthiere (2011) study the optimal tax/transfer policy under a 
utilitarian SWF in an economy where individuals can, through preventive health investment, 
affect their chances to reach the old age. In that economy, population members differ on three 
dimensions that, directly or indirectly, affect their life expectancy: genetic background, market 
productivity, and degree of myopia. At the laissez-faire equilibrium, individuals invest various 
amounts in prevention against premature death, depending on their labor income, on the shape of 
the survival process they face, and on their degree of myopia. Comparing this equilibrium with 
the social optimum under a utilitarian SWF reveals various differences. Individuals tend, because 
of myopia, to underinvest in prevention. Moreover, the utilitarian optimum also differs from the 
laissez-faire on the grounds that it equalizes consumptions across periods and individuals. As a 
consequence, the decentralization of the utilitarian social optimum requires not only a subsidy on 
savings and on prevention (in order to correct for myopia), but also lump sum transfers from 
high-productivity agents to low-productivity agents, and from agents with bad genetic 
background to individuals with good genetic background—the latter transfers contradicting, here 
again, any intuition for compensation. Note, however, that the postulated form of lifetime well-
being, here again, affects the form of the social optimum. If time-additive lifetime well-being 
were replaced by a concave transform of the sum of temporal well-being levels, the treatment of 
the short-lived would be significantly improved. 
Let us now consider the optimal resource allocation under a nonutilitarian, inequality-
sensitive SWF. Fleurbaey and Ponthiere (2013) study the implications of a maximin SWF 
defined on indices of realized lifetime well-being in an economy where individuals, who differ in 
their tastes, can affect their survival chances through preventive activities (e.g., jogging). As 
under exogenous survival conditions, the optimal consumption profiles are, from an ex post 
egalitarian perspective, decreasing with the age. Regarding the optimal prevention levels, 
Fleurbaey and Ponthiere show that the maximin SWF defined on indices of realized lifetime 
well-being leads to a strong differentiation of prevention levels across individuals, depending on 
their attitude toward prevention. Under the ex post egalitarian optimum, only individuals who 
like prevention—independently of its impact on future survival chances—should carry out a 
positive level of prevention, whereas individuals who dislike prevention—except insofar as this 
improves future survival prospects—should not invest in prevention. 
To understand the intuition behind that result, suppose that prevention increases the 
proportion of survivors, but without full success. From an ex post egalitarian perspective, what 
matters is to increase the realized well-being of the worst off, who are, in general, the short-lived, 
for whom prevention did not succeed. Among those unlucky short-lived persons, some dislike 
prevention, and, for these, investing in prevention has been a pure waste of resources. Hence, 
adopting an ex post point of view, unlucky short-lived persons who dislike prevention would 
have been better off provided that prevention—which turned out to be useless—had not been 
carried out. Given that the social planner, who cares about the unlucky short-lived, cannot 
identify, ex ante, with which person prevention will be successful or not, the optimal prevention 
level must be zero for those who dislike prevention. 
That corollary of the maximin SWF applied ex post is counterintuitive. When considering 
prevention issues, it is reasonable to promote large-scale prevention against early death, in such a 
way as to save as many lives as possible. Obviously, the maximin SWF applied ex post leads to 
low prevention levels for those who dislike prevention and, accordingly, does not allow us to 
save as many lives as possible. The maximin SWF applied on realized levels of lifetime well-
being lays strong emphasis on the well-being of the unlucky short-lived, for whom prevention 
has been a waste of resources, without considering the impact of prevention on the total number 
of survivors. The exclusive emphasis on the realized well-being of the unlucky short-lived leads 
to ignoring the impact of prevention on the proportion of survivors. 
Fleurbaey and Ponthiere (2013) study the tension between two goals: (1) promoting 
large-scale prevention, to reduce the extent of premature death; (2) minimizing inequalities in 
realized lifetime well-being due to unequal lifetimes (that is, compensating the prematurely 
dead). They show that there exists no SWF pursuing the two goals satisfactorily. Thus, concerns 
for prevention and for compensation ex post are logically incompatible: if it is socially desirable 
to raise prevention levels so as to increase the proportion of long-lived agents in the population, 
it must also be socially desirable to harm the living conditions of the unlucky short-lived who 
dislike prevention. Hence governments face a dilemma between postponing death and 
compensating the unlucky short-lived. Given that public preventive policies can be regarded as 
allowing for ex ante Pareto improvement, but may go against ex post equality, we find here 
another occurrence of the incompatibility between the ex ante Pareto principle and ex post 
equality, as studied in general terms by Mongin and Pivato (chapter 24, this Handbook). 
In sum, there exist, in the context of economies where individuals affect their survival 
chances, important tensions between public policies derived from the utilitarian SWF and from 
inequality-sensitive SWF applied ex post. This fact highlights the importance of studying the 
normative foundations of public health policies. Moreover, given that the optimal preventive 
policy is not independent of the overall shape of the life-cycle consumption profile, it remains 
true, as in section 3, that the differences regarding the treatment of the unlucky short-lived vary 
also depending on the postulated form for lifetime well-being (additive or not). This latter point 
reemphasizes the need for further scrutiny of the robustness of optimal public policies to the 
representation of lifetime well-being. 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
What do people do with their lives? What should government encourage them to do or not to do 
with their lives? These questions, which were at the very center of Foucault’s (2004) study of 
biopolitics—the art of governing and shaping human bodies—are quite complex, and deserve a 
more exhaustive treatment. The present chapter has focused on recent studies on the relationship 
between the quantity of life, lifetime well-being, and public policy. 
There exist various models aimed at explaining how individuals allocate their resources 
over their uncertain lifetime, and how they influence, through their behavior, their survival 
chances. Some models presuppose rational choices—that is, individuals choose what maximizes 
their expected lifetime well-being—whereas other models regard actual behaviors as resulting 
from behavioral mistakes, such as myopia, time inconsistency, or prodigality. 
On the policy side, the optimal public intervention depends on the particular social 
objective that is pursued. Clearly, the utilitarian SWF, by satisfying the ex ante Pareto principle, 
justifies public policies aimed at encouraging savings, annuitization, and preventive efforts, in 
such a way as to make the economy closer to the utilitarian social optimum. However, such 
policies may contradict what would be recommended by a nonutilitarian distribution-sensitive 
SWF applied on an ex post basis. Although increasing savings would benefit the lucky long-
lived, this would harm, from an ex post perspective, the unlucky short-lived, and would thus 
increase inequalities in realized lifetime well-being. The same observation can be made 
regarding the encouragement of annuitization and costly prevention, which are valuable only to 
the lucky long-lived, not to the unlucky short-lived. 
In this light, the general conflict between the ex ante Pareto principle and ex post equality 
raises lots of difficulties for the design of optimal public policies in the context of risky lifetimes. 
At the end of the day, the precise way in which governments should shape individual lives in 
terms of consumption and prevention remains a matter of social choice. 
References 
 
Adler, M. 2012. Well-Being and Fair Distribution. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Alesina, A., E. Glaeser, and B. Sacerdote. 2005. “Work and Leisure in the U.S. and Europe: Why So Different?” 
NBER Working Paper No. 11278. 
 
Angeletos, G., D. Laibson, A. Repetto, J. Tobacman, and S. Weinberg. 2001. “The Hyperbolic Consumption Model: 
Calibration, Simulation and Empirical Evaluation.” Journal of Economics Perspectives 15: 47–68. 
 
Arrhenius, G. Forthcoming. Population Ethics: The Challenge of Future Generations. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Arrow, K. J. 1971. “A Utilitarian Approach to the Concept of Equality in public Expenditures.” Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 85: 409–15. 
 
Asano, T., and A. Shibata. 2011. “Risk and Uncertainty in Health Investment.” European Journal of Health 
Economics 12: 79–85. 
 
Balia, S., and A. Jones. 2008. “Mortality, Lifestyles and Socio-Economic Status.” Journal of Health Economics 27: 
1–26. 
 
Barro, R., and G. Becker. 1989. “Fertility Choice in a Model of Economic Growth.” Econometrica 57 (2): 481–501. 
 
Becker, G., and C. Mulligan. 1998. “The Endogenous Determination of Time Preferences.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 112: 729–58. 
 
Becker, G., and K. Murphy. 1988. “A Theory of Rational Addiction.” Journal of Political Economy 96: 675–700. 
 
Becker, G., T. Philipson, and R. Soares. 2005. “The Quantity and the Quality of Life and the Evolution of World 
Inequality.” American Economic Review 95: 277–91. 
 
Benartzi, S., A. Previtero, and R. Thaler. 2011. “Annuitization Puzzles.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 25 (4): 
143–64. 
 
Bender, R., C. Trautner, M. Spraul, and M. Berger. 1998. “Assessment of Excess Mortality in Obesity.” American 
Journal of Epidemiology 147: 42–47. 
 
Bentham, J. 1789. Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. M. Warnock, ed., J. S. Mill: 
Utilitarianism. London: Fontana Press. 
 
Bernheim, D., and A. Rangel. 2004. “Addiction and Cue-Triggered Decision Processes.” American Economic 
Review 94: 1558–90. 
 
Besley, T. 1989. “Ex Ante Evaluation of Health States and the Provision for Ill-Health.” Economic Journal 99: 132–
46. 
 
Blackorby, C., W. Bossert, and D. Donaldson. 2005. Population Issues in Social Choice Theory, Welfare Economics 
and Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Blanchflower, D., and A. Oswald. 2008. “Is Well-Being U-Shaped over the Life Cycle?” Social Science and 
Medicine 66 (8): 1733–49. 
 
Bommier, A. 2006. “Uncertain Lifetime and Intertemporal Choice: Risk Aversion as a Rationale for Time 
Discounting.” International Economic Review 47: 1223–46. 
 
Bommier, A. 2007. “Risk Aversion, Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution and Correlation Aversion.” Economics 
Bulletin 29: 1–8. 
 
Bommier, A. 2010. “Portfolio Choice under Uncertain Lifetime.” Journal of Public Economic Theory 12 (1): 57–73. 
 
Bommier, A., and F. Legrand. 2014. “Too Risk Averse to Purchase Insurance? A Theoretical Glance at the Annuity 
Puzzle.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 48:135-166. 
 
Bommier, A., M. L. Leroux, and J. M. Lozachmeur. 2011a. “On the Public Economics of Annuities with 
Differentiated Mortality.” Journal of Public Economics 95: 612–23. 
 
Bommier, A., M. L. Leroux, and J. M. Lozachmeur. 2011b. “Differential Mortality and social Security.” Canadian 
Journal of Economics 44: 273–89. 
 
Borsch-Suspan, A., ed. 2003. Life-Cycle Saving and Public Policy: A Cross-National Study of Six Countries. New 
York: Academic Press. 
 
Botero, G. [1588] 1985. The Causes of the Greatness of Cities. Reprinted in part in Population and Development 
Review 11 (2): 335–40. 
 
Broome, J. 1992. Counting the Cost of Global Warming. Cambridge: White Horse Press. 
 
Broome, J. 2004. Weighing Lives. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Brown, J. 2001. “Private Pensions, Mortality Risk, and the Decision to Annuitize.” Journal of Public Economics 82: 
29–62. 
 
Brown, J., and J. Poterba. 2000. “Joint Life Annuities and Annuity Demand by Married Couples.” Journal of Risk 
and Uncertainty 67 (4): 527–54. 
 
Browning, M., and T. Crossley. 2001. “The Life-Cycle Model of Consumption and Saving.” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 15: 3–22. 
 
Camerer, C., S. Issacharoff, G. Lowenstein, T. O’Donoghe, and M. Rabbin. 2003. “Regulation for Conservatives: 
Behavioral Economics and the Case for ‘Asymmetric Paternalism.’” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 151: 
1211–54. 
 
Carpenter, C., D. Kloskaa, P. O’Malley, and L. Johnston. 2007. “Alcohol Control Policies and Youth Alcohol 
Consumption: Evidence from 28 years of Monitoring the Future.” B. E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy 7, 
article 25. 
 
Case, A., and A. Deaton. 2005. “Broken Down by Work and Sex: How Our Health Declines.” D. Wise, ed., 
Analyses in the Economics of Aging, 185–212. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Cawley, J., and J. Price. 2011. “Outcomes in a Program That Offers Financial Rewards for Weight Loss.” M. 
Grossman and N. Mocan, eds., Economics Aspects of Obesity, 91–126. Chicago: University of Chicago Press and 
NBER. 
 
Cawley, J., and C. Ruhm. 2012. “The Economics of Risky Health Behaviors.” M. V. Pauly, T. G. McGuire, and P. 
P. Barros, eds., Handbook of Health Economics, vol. 2, 95–200. Waltham, MA: Elsevier. 
 
Christensen, K., T. Johnson, and J. Vaupel. 2006. “The Quest for the Genetic Determinants of Human Longevity: 
Challenges and Insights.” Nature Reviews—Genetics 7: 436–48. 
 
Contoyannis, P., and A. Jones. 2004. “Socio-economic Status, Health and Lifestyle.” Journal of Health Economics 
23: 965–95. 
 
Cremer, H., P. de Donder, D. Maldonado, and P. Pestieau. 2008. “Designing an Optimal Linear Pension Scheme 
with Forced Savings and Wage Heterogeneity.” International Tax and Public Finance 15: 547–62. 
 
Cremer, H., P. de Donder, D. Maldonado, and P. Pestieau. 2012. “Taxing Sin Goods and Subsidizing Health Care.” 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 114: 101–23. 
 
Davidoff, T., J. Brown, and P. Diamond. 2005. “Annuities and Individual Welfare.” American Economic Review 95 
(5): 1573–90. 
 
Deaton, A. 1991. “Savings and Liquidity Constraints.” Econometrica 59 (5): 1221–48. 
 
Deaton, A. 1992. Understanding Consumption. Clarendon Lectures in Economics. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Diamond, P., and B. Koszegi. 2003. “Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting and Retirement.” Journal of Public Economics 
87: 1839–72. 
 
Doll, R., and B. Hill. 1950. “Smoking and Carcinoma of the Lung.” British Medical Journal 2: 739–47. 
 
Ehrlich, I., and H. Chuma. 1990. “A Model of the Demand for Longevity and the Value of Life Extension.” Journal 
of Political Economy 98: 761–82. 
 
Feldstein, M. 1985. “The Optimal Level of Social Security benefits.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 100: 303–21. 
 
Feldstein, M., and J. B. Liebman. 2002. “Social Security.” A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein, eds., Handbook of Public 
Economics, vol. 4, 2245–324. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
 
Fetherstonhaugh, D., and L. Ross. 1999. “Framing Effects and Income Flow Preferences in Decisions about Social 
Security.” H. Aaron, ed., Behavioral Dimensions of Retirement Economics, 187–214. Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution Press. 
 
Fleurbaey, M., and G. Gaulier. 2009. “International Comparisons of Living Standards by Equivalent Incomes.” 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 111: 597–624. 
 
Fleurbaey, M., M. L. Leroux, and G. Ponthiere. 2014. “Compensating the Dead.” Journal of Mathematical 
Economics 51: 28–41. 
 
Fleurbaey, M., and G. Ponthiere. 2013. “Prevention against Equality?” Journal of Public Economics 103: 68–84. 
 
Fong, G., D. Hammond, F. Laux, M. Zanna, M. Cummings, R. Borland, and H. Ross. 2004. “The Near Universal 
Experience of Regret among Smokers in Four Countries: Findings from the International Tobacco Control Policy 
Evaluation Survey.” Nicotine and Tobacco Research 6: S341–S351. 
 
Foucault, M. 2004. Naissance de la biopolitique. Cours au Collège de France, 1978–1979. Paris: Gallimard-Seuil. 
 
Friedman, M. 1957. A Theory of the Consumption Function. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Fuchs, V. 1982. “Time Preference and Health: An Exploratory Study.” V. Fuchs, ed., Economic Aspects of Health, 
93–120. Chicago: University of Chicago Press for the NBER. 
 
Goulao, C., and E. Thibault. 2013. “Physical Activity and Policy Recommendations: A Social Multiplier Approach.” 
B. E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy—Advances 13: 577–612. 
 
Gourinchas, P.-O., and J. Parker. 2002. “Consumption over the Life-Cycle.” Econometrica 70: 47–89. 
 
Grossman, M. 1972. “On the Concept of Health Capital and the Demand for Health.” Journal of Political Economy 
80: 223–55. 
 
Grossman, M. 2000. “The Human Capital Model.” A. Culyer and J. Newhouse, eds., Handbook of Health 
Economics, vol. 1A, 347–408. Elsevier, New York. 
 
Gruber, J., and B. Koszegi. 2000. “Is Addiction Rational? Theory and Evidence.” NBER Discussion Paper No. 
7507. 
 
Gruber, J., and B. Koszegi. 2001. “Is Addiction Rational? Theory and Evidence.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 
116: 1261–303. 
 
Hall, R., and C. Jones. 2007. “The Value of Life and the Rise in Health Spending.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 
122: 39–72. 
 
Holmer, M. 2003. “Simulation Analysis of Decision to Annuitize Pension Balances.” Policy Simulation group, 
September. 
 
Hombourg, S. 2000. “Compulsory Savings in the Welfare State.” Journal of Public Economics 77: 233–39. 
 
Honderich, T., ed. 1995. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Human Mortality Data base. University of California, Berkeley (USA), and Max Planck Institute for Demographic 
Research (Germany). Available at www.mortality.org 
 
Hurd, M. 1989. “Mortality Risk and Bequest.” Econometrica 57 (4): 779–813. 
 
James, E., and X. Song. 2001. “Annuities Markets around the World: Money’s Worth and Risk Intermediation.” 
Center for Research on Pensions and Welfare Policies, Turin, Italy. 
 
Jappelli, T., and F. Modigliani. 2005. “The Age-Saving Profile and Life-Cycle Hypothesis.” F. Francesco, ed., The 
Collected Papers of Franco Modigliani, vol. 6, 141–72. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Jarvis, M., D. McIntyre, and C. Bats. 2002. “Effectiveness of Smoking Cessation Initiatives.” British Medical 
Journal 324: 608–9. 
 
Jevons, W. S. 1971. The Theory of Political Economy. Ed. Collison Black. London: Pelican Classics. 
 
Johnson, R., L. Burman, and D. Kobes. 2004. “Annuitized Wealth at Older Ages: Evidence from the Health and 
Retirement Study.” Final Report to the Employee Benefits Security Administration. Washington, DC: US 
Department of Labor, Urban Institute. 
 
Kahneman, D., and A. Tversky. 1979. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk.” Econometrica 47: 
263–91. 
 
Kahneman, D., P. Wakker, and R. Sarin. 1997. “Back to Bentham? Explorations of Experienced Utility.” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 112 (2): 375–405. 
 
Kamm, F. 1993. Morality, Mortality. Vol. 1: Death and Whom to Save from It. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Kotlikof, L., and A. Spivak. 2001. “The Family as an Incomplete Annuities Market.” Journal of Political Economy 
89 (2): 372–91. 
 
Laibson, D. 1997. “Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (2): 443–77. 
 
Laibson, D. 1998. “Life Cycle Consumption and Hyperbolic Discount Functions.” European Economic Review 42: 
861–71. 
 
Lee, R., and S. Tuljapurkar. 1997. “Death, and Taxes: Longer Life, Consumption, and Social Security.” 
Demography 34: 67–81. 
 
Leroux, M. L., P. Pestieau, and G. Ponthiere. 2011. “Longevity, Genes and Efforts: An Optimal Taxation Approach 
to Prevention.” Journal of Health Economics 30: 62–76. 
 
Leroux, M. L., and G. Ponthiere. 2009. “Optimal Tax Policy and Expected Longevity: A Mean and Variance Utility 
Approach.” International Tax and Public Finance 16 (4): 514–37. 
 
Leroux, M. L., and G. Ponthiere. 2013. “Utilitarianism and Unequal Longevity: A Remedy?” Economic Modelling 
30: 888–99. 
 
Malthus, T. R. [1798] 1970. An Essay on the Principle of Population. Ed. Anthony Flew. New York: Pelican. 
Includes A Summary View of the Principle of Population (1830). 
 
Manski, C. 2000. “Economic Analyses of Social Interactions.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14: 115–36. 
 
Marx, K. 1844. Critique de l’economie politique (manuscrits de 1844). Paris: Union Générale d’Editions. 
 
Marx, K. [1867] 1970. Capital. Ed. F. Engels. 3 vols. London: Lawrence and Wishart. 
 
McKerlie, D. 1989. “Equality and time.” Ethics 99: 475–91. 
 
McMahan, J. 2003. The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Mirrlees, J. 1982. “The Economic Uses of Utilitarianism.” A. Sen and B. Williams, eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond, 
63–84. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Modigliani, F. 1986. “Life Cycle, Individual Thrift, and the Wealth of Nations.” American Economic Review 76: 
297–313. 
 
Modigliani, F., and A. Ando. 1963. “The ‘Life Cycle’ Hypothesis of Savings: Aggregate Implications and Tests.” 
American Economic Review 53: 55–84. 
 
Mullahy, J., and P. Portney. 1990. “Air Pollution, Cigarette Smoking and the Production of Respiratory Health.” 
Journal of Health Economics 9: 193–205. 
 
Mullahy, J., and J. Sindelar. 1996. “Employment, Unemployment, and the Problem of Drinking.” Journal of Health 
Economics 15: 409–34. 
 
O’Donoghe, T., and M. Rabbin. 2003. “Studying Optimal Paternalism, Illustrated by a Model of Sin Taxes.” 
American Economic Review 93: 186–91. 
 
O’Donoghe, T., and M. Rabbin. 2006. “Optimal Sin Taxes.” Journal of Public Economics 90: 1825–49. 
 
Pareto, W. 1909. Manuel d’economie politique. Paris: Cujas. 
 
Parfit, D. 1984. Reasons and Persons, New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Pestieau, P., and G. Ponthiere. 2012. “Myopia, Regrets and Risky Behavior.” International Tax and Public Finance 
19: 288–317. 
 
Pestieau, P., and U. Possen. 2008. “Prodigality and Myopia: Two Rationales for Social Security.” Manchester 
School 76: 629–52. 
 
Picone, G., M. Uribe, and R. Mark Wilson. 1998. “The Effect of Uncertainty on the Demand for Medical Care, 
Health Capital and Wealth.” Journal of Health Economics 17: 171–85. 
 
Poikolainen, K. 1982. “Alcohol Use and Mortality.” S. Preston, ed., Biological and Social Aspects of Mortality and 
the Length of Life, 417–33. Liège: Ordina Editions. 
 
Poterba, J., ed. 1994. International Comparison of Household Saving. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Poterba, J. 2001. “Annuity Markets and Retirement Security.” Fiscal Studies 22 (3): 249–70. 
 
Rawls, J. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Saffer, H., and F. Chaloupka. 2000. “The Effect of Tobacco Advertising Bans on Tobacco Consumption.” Journal 
of Health Economics 19: 1117–37. 
 
Sen, A. 1973. On Economic Inequality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Simon, H. 1954. “Bandwagon and Underdog Effects of Election Predictions.” Public Opinion Quarterly 18: 245–53. 
 
Simon, H. 1955. “A Behavioural Model of Rational Choice.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 69: 99–118. 
 
Slovic, P. 2001. “Cigarette Smokers: Rational Actors or Rational Fools?” P. Slovic, ed., Smoking: Risk, Perception 
and Policy, 97–126. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Smith, A. [1776] 1922. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Ed. E. Cannan. 3rd ed. 
London: Methuen. 
 
Stamler, J. 1973. “Epidemiology of Coronary Heart Disease.” Medical Clinics of North America 57: 5–46. 
 
Starmer, C. 2000. “Developments in Non-expected Utility Theory: The Hunt for a Descriptive Theory of Choice 
under Risk.” Journal of Economic Literature 38: 332–82. 
 
Thaler, R. 1981. “Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency.” Economics Letters 8: 201–7. 
 
Thaler, R., and H. Shefrin. 1981. “An Economic Theory of Self-Control.” Journal of Political Economy 89: 392–
406. 
 
Thaler, R., and C. Sunstein. 2003. “Behavioural Economics, Public Policy, and Paternalism.” American Economic 
Review 93: 175–79. 
 
Thaler, R., and C. Sunstein. 2008. Nudge. New York: Penguin. 
 
Usher, D. 1973. “An Imputation to the Measure of Economic Growth for Changes in Life Expectancy.” M. Moss, 
The Measurement of Economic and Social Performance, 193–232. New York: NBER. 
 
Veenhoven, R. 1996. “Happy Life-Expectancy: A Comprehensive Measure of Quality-of-Life in Nations” Social 
Indicators Research 39: 1–58. 
 
Yaari, M. 1965. “Uncertain Lifetime, Life Insurance and the Theory of the Consumer.” Review of Economic Studies 
32: 137–50. 
 
Yaari, M. 1987. “The Dual Theory of Choice under Risk.” Econometrica 55: 95–115. 
 
                                                          
2
 Sources: The Human Mortality Database, University of California, Berkeley, and Max Planck Institute 
for Demographic Research, Germany. 
3
 Note that there exists, in Malthus’s Essay, another adjustment mechanism, which reduces the population 
size through a smaller number of births: preventive population checks. 
5
 On the difficulties raised by variable population size for normative analysis, see Parfit 1984; Broome 
1992; Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson 2005; and Arrhenius, forthcoming. See also Broome, 
chapter 30, this Handbook. 
6
 Note, however, that this assumption is no longer weak once one starts considering nonnormal lives, i.e., 
lives involving brain transplants, psychological diseases, or strong discontinuities in mental life. 
This important qualification was made by Parfit (1984). If one considers nonnormal lives, the 
lack of psychological continuity between different temporal selves questions the fact that a 
human being remains one and the same person from birth until death. I assume, in the rest of this 
chapter, that lives are normal lives. 
7
 On hedonic well-being, see Haybron, chapter 12, this Handbook. The preferences-based view of well-
being is examined by Bykvist, chapter 11, this Handbook. 
8
 For a general examination of the equivalent income approach to well-being measurement, see Fleurbaey, 
chapter 16, this Handbook. Note that the equivalent income approach is not the only possible 
approach to preferences-based well-being measurement. Adler, in chapter 17 of this Handbook, 
explores an alternative road: the extended-preferences approach. 
9
 See also Becker, Philipson, and Soares 2005; Hall and Jones 2007; and Fleurbaey and Gaulier 2009. 
10
 On this, see the study by Leroux and Ponthiere (2009), who obtain, under time-additive lifetime well-
being, risk aversion with respect to the duration of life by assuming a mean and variance utility 
framework, in line with regret theory. 
11
 On the life-cycle hypothesis and its implications, see Modigliani 1986 and Deaton 1992. 
12
 That rationale does not hold if individuals prefer their descendants to consume their own resources 
rather than consuming these by themselves. 
13
 “Actuarially fair” means that buying annuities for an amount x brings, under a survival rate p, a total 
return equal to x(1 + r) / p, where r is the market interest rate. 
14
 James and Song (2001) find similar results for other countries. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
15
 The family insurance function is also studied by Brown and Poterba (2001). 
16
 On this, see also Bommier and Legrand 2013. 
17
 Prospect theory has two important features: (1) utility is no longer associated with consumed quantities, 
but with gains or losses in consumed quantities with respect to a status quo; (2) individual choices 
are not governed by the right probabilities of different states of natures, but by transformed 
probabilities (unlikely events being assigned larger subjective probabilities, while the opposite 
holds for very likely events). 
18
 On preference inconsistencies, see Shafir, chapter 28, this Handbook. 
20
 On the choice between lifetime and sublifetime approaches to an egalitarian SWF, see Adler 2012, ch. 
6. 
21
 Other empirical studies include Mullahy and Portney 1990; Mullahy and Sindelar 1996; Bender et al. 
1998; and Contoyannis and Jones 2004. 
22
 On the Grossman model, see also Ehrlich and Chuma 1990 and Grossman 2000. 
23
 On the impact of excess alcohol, see Poikolainen 1982; on excessive or inadequate eating, see Stamler 
1973 and Bender et al. 1998. 
24
 Similar proportions are found in the United Kingdom by Jarvis, McIntyre, and Bats (2002) and by Fong 
et al. (2004) for Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. 
25
 On optimism and subjective probabilities in general, see Kahneman and Tversky 1979 and Yaari 1987. 
For recent advances, see the survey by Starmer (2000). 
26
 On Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote’s (2005) model for the choice of physical activity, see Goulao and 
Thibault 2013. 
27
 Other studies on optimal sin taxes include Cremer et al. 2012 and Pestieau and Ponthiere 2012. 
